Product
eMCP
vHSM
Garnet
Dyneemes
Buckypaper
Sylica
Nitride
Vault
Platform · Buckypaper · Confidential VMs

Your virtual machines, sealed at the silicon

Buckypaper runs the VMs you already have inside hardware-enforced trusted execution environments — memory encrypted during execution, the operator excluded, every boot attested. No changes to your workloads.

Migrating an estate? Buckypaper is the landing zone of the VMware exit.

Hardware-isolated environments — protection at silicon level
No code changes to existing VM workloads
Post-quantum safe encryption
Runs across European clouds, hyperscalers and on-prem
What it is

The VM you know, inside a boundary nothing else can read

A Buckypaper VM behaves like any virtual machine your team operates today — same images, same tooling, same lifecycle. The difference is where it runs: inside a hardware enclave whose memory is encrypted during execution, with keys that never belong to the infrastructure and release only against a successful attestation of the exact VM state you approved.

That single change removes the assumption the rest of your security stack exists to compensate for — that whoever operates the host can read the guest. Hypervisor administrators, cloud operators and anyone with physical access to the machine hold no readable path to the workload. It's the operator-exclusion mechanism, packaged as the most familiar unit in infrastructure: a VM.

What Buckypaper enforces

Each is enforced in hardware and evidenced cryptographically, not asserted in a report.

Runtime memory encryption
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VM memory stays encrypted while the workload executes — the in-use gap that at-rest and in-transit encryption leave open is closed at the silicon.

Attestation per instance
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Every VM proves its integrity cryptographically before keys release: the image, configuration and platform state are measured, and evidence is available for your auditors on demand.

Keys outside the infrastructure
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Disk and secret keys live in vHSM/Vault under your custody — released to a VM only when its attestation matches policy, never held by the host.

Post-quantum safe encryption
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NIST-standardized algorithms protect VM encryption against “harvest now, decrypt later” — the property that made Buckypaper part of the NATO DIANA architecture.

Lift, don't rewrite
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Existing images move into confidential VMs without application changes — which is what keeps migration projects scoped in weeks.

Any estate shape
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European providers, hyperscalers, or your own datacenter — the protection model is identical, so placement follows your requirements, not the architecture's.

Technical fit
ComponentDetail
Trusted execution
AMD SEV-SNP (EPYC Milan or later); Intel TDX (Xeon Emerald Rapids or later)
Key management
vHSM / Vault integration; attestation-bound key release; BYOK/HYOK patterns
Operations
Managed via eMCP — one control plane across providers; standard image formats
Evidence
Attestation reports and immutable logs, exportable for audit

[PLACEHOLDER — SILICON LIST PENDING THE STANDING INTEL TDX RULING: THE GARNET BRIEF, 5G DOCUMENTATION AND DIANA ONE-PAGER ALL LIST INTEL TDX (AND ARM CCA); THE eMCP PAGE CURRENTLY OMITS IT. ONE DECISION, APPLIED EVERYWHERE.]

How it proves itself
Fig. 2 — no attest, no key
Show: failed attestation
1

Workload starts

Code, config and platform state measured by the CPU

2

Evidence produced

Hardware-rooted attestation report, signed

3

Policy checked

Nitride verifies the measurement against your policy

4

Keys released

vHSM and vault unseal — only now, only to this workload

Outcome
Keys released
Fig. 2 — no attest, no key
Show: valid workload
1

Workload starts

Tampered image, injected container or rogue host

2

Evidence produced

Measurement does not match what you approved

3

Policy rejects

Mismatch logged with its reason, for the audit file

4

Nothing released

No keys, no secrets — the data stays ciphertext

Outcome
Nothing readable
FAQ

What teams ask about Buckypaper

Q·01

Do we have to modify our VM images?

No — existing images run inside confidential VMs without application changes. The enclave boundary is provided by the platform and the underlying silicon, not by your code.

Q·02

What's the performance impact?

Memory encryption runs in hardware, designed to preserve computing performance.

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Q·03

How does this relate to Dyneemes and eMCP?

Buckypaper is the VM tier; Dyneemes is the Kubernetes tier that can run on it; eMCP is the control plane operating both across your clouds. Most estates run all three.

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Get started

Bring an image. Watch it seal

A representative VM, your cloud of choice, attestation evidence at the end — the shortest possible path from claim to proof.

Coming from VMware? The exit path. Kubernetes estate? Dyneemes.

Certifications & security
Certified ISO/IEC 27001
IT Security made in Germany — TeleTrusT